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“AGAINST THE DEFENDANT”:




Rarely is there a proverbial “smoking gun” in criminal pros-
ecutions.1  Instead, prosecutors and defense attorneys must tell 
juries competing stories—largely from circumstantial evidence—
and allow jurors to determine what happened based on inferences 
gleaned from argument and testimony.2  Naturally, this creates 
substantial uncertainty for both prosecutors and defendants.  In-
stead of rolling the dice at trial, the vast majority of criminal mat-
ters are resolved through plea bargaining.3  Plea bargaining pro-
vides both sides with a certainty otherwise unobtainable through 
a traditional trial.  The prosecution guarantees itself a conviction, 
and the defendant will often receive a lighter sentence than if he 
or she had gone to trial.  The judiciary also benefits in the form of 
a lighter docket. 
However, negotiations between the prosecutor and defend-
ant do not always result in guilty pleas.  Communication may 
break down, sending the case to trial.  During negotiations, the 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2021.  Editor-in-Chief of the
Arkansas Law Review, 2020-2021.  This author sincerely thanks Professor Alex Nunn, Uni-
versity of Arkansas School of Law, for his guidance and wisdom during the writing pro-
cess.  The author would also like to thank the remarkable editors of the Arkansas Law Re-
view for their attention to detail and precision while editing.  Finally, the author thanks his 
family and friends for their continual support and encouragement. 
1. This is especially true when prosecuting crimes that do not rely on physical evi-
dence.  See Jonathan D. Glater & Ken Belson, In White-Collar Crimes, Few Smoking Guns, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/12/business/in-whitecollar-
crimes-few-smoking-guns.html.  
2. See Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 45
HOUSTON L. REV. 1801, 1802-03 (2009). 
3. Kyle Fleck, Plea Negotiations: Why the Presumption of Waivability Does Not Apply
to Federal Rule of Evidence 410, 51 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 839, 839 (2018) (noting that 
“ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are 
the result of guilty pleas”) (alteration adopted). 
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criminal defendant may have made statements or concessions that 
would be prejudicial if presented to a jury.  Congress, to protect 
criminal defendants and encourage plea bargaining, stepped in 
and passed Federal Rule of Evidence 410, which prohibits the 
prosecution from presenting any statements made during plea dis-
cussions.4 
Critically, for purposes of this Comment, Rule 410 is silent 
as to whether the defendant can present such evidence against the 
prosecution.5  As a matter of statutory interpretation, this silence 
means courts should weigh the relevance and probative value of 
evidence offered by the defendant against any unfair prejudice to 
determine admissibility.6  Instead, courts have largely held that 
Rule 410 prohibits statements from plea negotiations, regardless 
of whether the evidence is being presented by the defendant or 
against the defendant.7  This trend is problematic, legally and 
practically. 
Legally, this disregard for the statute’s plain language is in 
direct conflict with the fundamental principles of statutory inter-
pretation.8  The Federal Rules of Evidence (the Rule(s)) are es-
sentially an instruction manual for courts.  Judges are instructed 
to admit relevant evidence unless, among other things, a Rule pro-
vides otherwise.  In some cases, such as Rule 410, Congress has 
predetermined admissibility.  The majority of evidence, however, 
is admitted or excluded after the trial judge conducts a fact-inten-
sive, case-by-case inquiry.9  When courts forego this process and 
instead use Rule 410 to impose a blanket prohibition on plea-re-
lated evidence, they act contrary to clear legislative instruction.10  
Practically, it prevents criminal defendants from presenting evi-
dence of an innocent conscience or the prosecution’s doubt of the 
defendant’s guilt.11 
4. See FED. R. EVID. 410.
5. See FED. R. EVID. 410.
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 143 (3d. ed 2013).
8. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (stating
courts must enforce a statute according to its terms when the result is not absurd). 
9. See FED. R. EVID. 401-03.
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See Colin Miller, Deal or No Deal: Why Courts Should Allow Defendants to Pre-
sent Evidence that They Rejected Favorable Plea Bargains, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 407, 408 
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Part I will provide the history of Rule 410’s legislative en-
actment and subsequent judicial applications.  Most importantly, 
it will give insight as to how the majority trend came to be.  It is 
also worth comparing the historical versions of Rule 410 to the 
Rule’s current language.  Part II begins with a summary of the 
two primary forms of statutory interpretation—purposivism and 
textualism.  This section then provides a deeper review of these 
competing theories as they relate to judicial interpretations of the 
Rules. 
Part III contains a statutory analysis of Rule 410.  First, this 
section removes Rule 410 from an ongoing debate in the legal 
community as to whether the Rules are statutes or codifications 
of the common law.  Second, it establishes that textualism pro-
vides the only proper interpretation of Rule 410.  This section 
concludes by finding that Rule 410 does not prohibit evidence of 
statements made during plea negotiations when offered by the de-
fendant.  Finally, Part IV shows that the current evidentiary 
scheme is capable of handling defendant-offered evidence.  Ad-
ditionally, it pushes back on common justifications for the major-
ity trend. 
I. RULE 410’S HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS
Our modern evidentiary regime is a product of common law
adjudication, historical evolution, and the balancing of competing 
interests inherent within our modern legal system.12  Given the 
multitude of factors that drive our evidentiary scheme, it should 
come as no surprise that the process of codifying the Rules has 
often yielded somewhat ambiguous results.  Take for example, 
(2011) (discussing State v. Woodsum, 624 A.2d 1342 (N.H. 1993), where a defendant was 
prevented from presenting evidence of a rejected plea offer as proof of an innocent state of 
mind); 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:71 
(4th ed. 2019) (stating a prosecutor may concede that the jury will doubt parts of her case 
during plea discussions). 
12. See Glen Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules
of Evidence as a Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1539, 1552 
(1999) [hereinafter Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia] (“The Federal Rules of Evidence rep-
resent a codification of preexisting common law . . . .”); see also Michael Teter, Acts of 
Emotion: Analyzing Congressional Involvement in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 58 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 153, 159 (2008) (noting the “substantive” nature of the rules and the tension be-
tween the legislative and judicial branches in the rules’ creation).
428 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:2 
Rule 410, which has an especially convoluted and “murky” his-
tory.13  
The drafting of Rule 410, which consisted of multiple ver-
sions and amendments, produced a seemingly straightforward ev-
identiary rule.  Its current form, sometimes referred to as “the De-
cember 1980 version,”14 states in relevant part: 
(a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of
the following is not admissible against the defendant who
made the plea or participated in the plea discussions:
(1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn;
(2) a nolo contendere plea;
(3) a statement made during a proceeding on either of
those pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11 or a comparable state procedure; or
(4) a statement made during plea discussions with an
attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions
did not result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a later-
withdrawn guilty plea.15
Despite Rule 410’s facial clarity, courts have struggled to 
interpret and apply the rule.16  In particular, courts have wrestled 
with a problem that arises when a defendant wishes to admit evi-
dence flowing from plea negotiations, such as a prosecutor’s 
statements or the defendant’s refusal to plead guilty.17  Courts 
faced with this situation largely have two options.18  First, a judge 
may try to ascertain Rule 410’s purpose by considering contextual 
factors such as legislative history.  Using this purposivist inter-
pretation, the majority of courts have ruled that evidence flowing 
from plea negotiations is inadmissible regardless of which party 
presents it.19 
Second, courts may defer to Rule 410’s plain textual mean-
ing and rule that such evidence is per se inadmissible only when 
13. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:64 (quotation marks omitted).
14. Id.
15. FED. R. EVID. 410 (emphasis added).
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. There is a third option—deem the evidence inadmissible hearsay.  The hearsay
approach is outside the scope of this article.  Briefly summarized, a proper hearsay analysis 
leads to the conclusion that such evidence is not inadmissible hearsay, and the admissibility 
should be determined by a Rule 403 balancing test.  See Miller, supra note 11, at 437-42. 
19. See FISHER, supra note 7.
2020 “AGAINST THE DEFENDANT” 429 
offered against the defendant.  Under this textualist approach, rul-
ing on the evidence’s admissibility when offered by a defendant 
requires the court to determine whether it is relevant and weigh 
its probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice.20 
A. Rule 410’s Legislative History
Rule 410’s history is “a murky fog that obscures more than 
it illuminates.”21  While common law values provided the foun-
dation for the majority of the Rules,22 the notion that evidence 
from plea negotiations should be excluded from trial is relatively 
new.23  Rule 410 is also unique from other Rules in that it was not 
scheduled to go into effect until August 1975, while the rest of 
the Rules took effect a month earlier.24  This delay was caused by 
initial concerns that Rule 410 would be duplicative and unneces-
sary.  At the time, Congress was considering the new Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) that was identical to, and would 
supersede, Rule 410.25  This tension was later resolved when Rule 
410 became the only rule regarding the admissibility of state-
ments from plea negotiations.26  These identical rules, as origi-
nally enacted, stated in relevant part: 
[E]vidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of
nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo con-
tendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of state-
ments made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or
offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal action, case,
20. See FED. R. EVID. 401-03.
21. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:64.
22. Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia, supra note 12, at 1552.
23. Our nation’s system of pleas only dates back to the twentieth century.  Albert W.
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979) (noting that 
1892 marked the first time the Supreme Court upheld a guilty-plea conviction).  By the 
1930’s, plea bargaining was a regular practice.  Id. at 33 (“[I]n 1936, 77% of all felony con-
victions were by plea of guilty.  By 1938, the figure was 80%, and by 1940, 86% . . . .”).  By 
the 1970’s, plea bargaining had become an “essential component of the administration of 
justice.”  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
24. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:64.
25. Id.
26. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) (cross-referencing FED. R. EVID. 410).
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or proceeding against the person who made the plea or of-
fer.27 
 Five years later, in December 1980, Rule 410 was amended, 
resulting in its current language.28  Congress amended Rule 410 
with “the primary purpose of clarifying exactly what evidence re-
lating to plea bargaining [the Rules] render inadmissible.”29  Of 
particular importance, the original 1975 language “against the 
person who made the plea or offer” became “against the defend-
ant who made the plea or participated in the plea discussions.”30  
In the December 1980 amendment, the advisory committee, 
vaguely addressing that change, only added to the present confu-
sion by stating that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) 
and the identical Rule 410 do “not also provide that the described 
evidence is inadmissible ‘in favor of’ the defendant. This is not 
intended to suggest, however, that such evidence will inevitably 
be admissible in the defendant’s favor.”31  Thus, while not per se 
admissible when offered by the defendant, statements from plea 
negotiations were plainly deemed inadmissible if offered against 
a defendant. 
B. Courts’ Interpretation and Application of Rule 410
Courts’ interpretations and applications of Rule 410 have ex-
acerbated the problems that were at the center of its muddled and 
difficult codification process.  In particular, courts have struggled 
to apply Rule 410 when a criminal defendant tries to present state-
ments from plea negotiations.32  This is especially problematic for 
a criminal defendant, as this evidence could be used to argue that 
the prosecutor did not believe in her theory of the case or to show 
27. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (emphasis added) (amended
in 1980 with current version at FED. R. EVID. 410). 
28. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:64.
29. Miller, supra note 11, at 412-13.
30. Compare Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (emphasis added)
(providing Rule 410’s original language), with FED. R. EVID. 410 (emphasis added). 
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (advisory committee’s note to 1979 amendment).  This lan-
guage indicates that Congress intended for trial courts to determine admissibility through 
Rules 401-03.  See infra Part IV. 
32. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:71.
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the defendant’s innocent state of mind.33  Despite being textually 
permissible under Rule 410, courts have largely held the evidence 
inadmissible in light of Rule 410’s goal of fostering plea negoti-
ations.34  This trend began with the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Verdoorn, where the court prevented a defendant 
from presenting evidence that he had rejected a favorable plea of-
fer.35  However, in United States v. Biaggi, the Second Circuit 
distinguished from Verdoorn and allowed a defendant to present 
evidence that he rejected an offer of immunity.36 
i. Verdoorn:  Birth of a Blanket Prohibition
The majority trend of imposing a blanket prohibition on 
statements from plea negotiations traces back to a 1976 decision 
from the Eighth Circuit.  In United States v. Verdoorn, a defend-
ant attempted to challenge the strength of the government’s case 
by introducing evidence that he rejected a plea offer that only re-
quired him to admit to lesser charges and guaranteed him a shorter 
sentence.37  Affirming the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence, 
the Verdoorn court discussed two statutes in its decision: Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(6) and Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 408.38  Despite Rule 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 11(e)(6) specifically governing the admissibility of state-
ments from plea negotiations in criminal trials, the Verdoorn 
court chose to rely on the spirit of Rule 408, finding that “govern-
ment proposals concerning pleas should be excludable.”39  The 
Verdoorn court made clear its logic was influenced by the judici-
ary’s wish to protect and encourage plea bargaining: 
33. Id.  This evidence may come in the form of a prosecutor offering a plea to a lesser
charge or conceding that a jury may doubt parts of her case.  Id.  Alternatively, the evidence 
could come in the form of a defendant rejecting a plea that would guarantee him a more 
lenient sentence.  Id. 
34. FISHER, supra note 7 (stating that, since evidence offered against the prosecutor
“would frustrate the purpose of the rule, courts generally have ignored” the rule’s plain lan-
guage).  
35. United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1976).
36. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 691 (2nd Cir. 1990).
37. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d at 107.
38. Id.  Verdoorn was decided on January 13, 1976; therefore, the Verdoorn court re-
lied on the broader original language of Rule 410.  See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
595, 88 Stat. 1926 for the Rule’s original language. 
39. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d at 107.
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Plea bargaining has been recognized as an essential compo-
nent of the administration of justice.  “Properly adminis-
tered, it is to be encouraged.”  If such a policy is to be fos-
tered, it is essential that plea negotiations remain confidential 
to the parties if they are unsuccessful.  Meaningful dialogue 
between the parties would, as a practical matter, be impossi-
ble if either party had to assume the risk that plea offers 
would be admissible in evidence.40 
The Verdoorn decision remains a fundamental touchpoint 
for courts wishing to exclude statements from plea negotiations 
offered by a defendant.41 
ii. Biaggi: The Traditional Evidentiary Analysis
Fourteen years later, the Second Circuit distinguished from 
Verdoorn in United States v. Biaggi by finding that Rule 410 al-
lows a defendant to admit evidence of a rejected offer for immun-
ity.42  The Biaggi court’s logic had two components.  First, the 
opinion notes that under Rule 410, “plea negotiations are inad-
missible ‘against the defendant,’ and it does not necessarily fol-
low that the Government is entitled to a similar shield.”43  Next, 
the court employed the traditional evidentiary analysis by evalu-
ating the relevance, probative force, and potential unfair prejudice 
of the rejected immunity offer.44  The Biaggi court held that the 
probative force of a rejected immunity offer “is clearly strong 
enough to render it relevant” because when a defendant rejects an 
immunity offer “his action is probative of a state of mind devoid 
of guilty knowledge.”45  Finally, the Biaggi court addressed the 
“closer question” of whether excluding the rejected immunity 
40. Id. (internal citations omitted).
41. Verdoorn has been relied on by federal courts as well as state courts interpreting
state rules modeled after Rule 410 and FRCP 11(e)(6).  See e.g., United States v. Geisen, 
612 F.3d 471, 496 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(“Verdoorn has settled the matter in our circuit”); State v. Tony M., 213 A.3d 1128, 1142 
(Conn. 2019); State v. Dalrymple, 2003 WL 22176218 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“Following 
the reasoning in Verdoorn” to prohibit defendant from admitting plea offer). 
42. Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 691.  Note that Biaggi was decided on June 29, 1990, and,
therefore, the Biaggi court relied on the current language of Rule 410.  See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
43. Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 690 (internal citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 690-91.
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offer violated Rule 403.46  Ultimately, “the exclusion of [the de-
fendant’s] state of mind evidence denied him a fair trial.”47 
The Biaggi court compared a rejected immunity offer to the 
Verdoorn defendant’s rejected plea for lesser charges and a 
lighter sentence.  The court noted that a plea rejection “could also 
evidence an innocent state of mind, but the inference is not nearly 
so strong as” rejected immunity.48  Still, the Second Circuit indi-
cated that a rejected plea offer could be relevant to show an inno-
cent state of mind: 
Let the accused’s whole conduct come in; and whether it tells 
for consciousness of guilt or for consciousness of innocence, 
let us take it for what it is worth, remembering that in either 
case it is open to varying explanations and is not to be em-
phasized.  Let us not deprive an innocent person, falsely ac-
cused, of the inference which common sense draws from a 
consciousness of innocence and its natural manifestations.49 
As noted, many courts still quote and rely on Verdoorn.50  
Despite the significantly different approach to Rule 410, few 
courts have directly confronted the tension between Verdoorn and 
Biaggi.51   
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Statutory interpretation is immensely important.52  Although 
the judiciary’s approach to construing statutes has varied method-
ologically over time, modern statutory interpretation is rooted in 
the idea of “legislative supremacy.”53  Legislative supremacy 
commands courts to interpret statutes in a way that gives “effect 
46. Id. at 691.
47. Id.
48. Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 691.
49. Id. (quoting 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 293, at 232 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979)).
50. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
51. See United States v. Geisen, 612 F.3d 471, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Christensen, 2016 WL
1753600 (D. Ariz. 2016); State v. Woodsum, 624 A.2d 1342, 1344 (N.H. 1993).
52. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31 (1982) (stat-
ing that it is even more important in the modern era in light of the “statutorification of the 
American legal system”). 
53. E.g., John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 2397, 2400-01 (2017) [hereinafter Manning, Without Intent]. 
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to the intent of Congress.”54  How a court should determine con-
gressional intent is the focus of intense debate among practition-
ers, academics, and judges alike.55  The debate largely boils down 
to two approaches: purposivism and textualism.56 
A. Purposivism and Textualism
When a statute’s plain meaning is clear, there should be no 
struggle between a purposivist or textualist interpretation.57  Only 
when the statute presents ambiguities should a judge turn to his 
or her personal philosophy to resolve that ambiguity.58  However, 
this so-called “plain meaning” approach is often conflated with 
textualism.59  Thus, the divide between purposivism and textual-
ism is important regardless of how clear a statute’s plain language 
appears. 
Purposivists, who view legislating as “a purposive act,” be-
lieve “judges should construe statutes to execute that legislative 
purpose.”60  In an attempt to observe legislative supremacy, pur-
posivists look to the problem Congress faced and try to discover 
how the statute was meant to solve that problem.61  A purposivist 
54. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
55. See generally VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RES. SERV., R45153, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45153.pdf. 
56. Id. at 10.
57. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296-97 (2006)
(quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)) 
(“When the statutory language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) 
(“Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpre-
tation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.”); 
S.C. Produce Ass’n v. Comm’r, 50 F.2d 742, 744 (4th Cir. 1931) (“[W]here there is no am-
biguity, there is no need for either a liberal or strict construction.”).
58. See Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485.
59.  Morrell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms With Strict and Liberal Construction, 64
ALB. L. REV. 9, 45 (2000) (stating that “courts sometimes muddle [the] simple relationship 
[between purposivism, textualism, and plain meaning] by combining strict construction and 
‘plain meaning’ (or its variants) together in mindless fashion”); see also Robin Kundis Craig, 
The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters: Statutory Conversations and a Cultural 
Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955, 971-72 (2005) 
(conflating textualism and the plain meaning approach). 59.  
60. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 31 (2014).
61. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 358 (1990). 
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court considers “how Congress makes its purposes known, 
through text and reliable accompanying materials constituting 
legislative history.”62  Thus, purposivism is a results-oriented phi-
losophy, and purposivist judges will avoid outcomes they view as 
contrary to a statute’s purpose.63  The inevitable struggle for pur-
posivists is therefore a question of limits—how far outside of the 
statute’s text will a purposivist judge go to achieve a particular 
result?64   
Textualism, on the other hand, “emphasiz[es] text over any 
unstated purpose.”65  Textualism observes legislative supremacy 
by focusing on the statute’s words because those words are what 
survived the constitutionally prescribed legislative process and 
have the force of law.66  Textualists read a statue the way a regular 
62. See KATZMANN, supra note 60, at 3.
63. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-08 (1979) (using
legislative history to determine “Congress’ primary concern” when passing the law and re-
fusing to interpret that law in a way “completely at variance with” that purpose) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Craig, supra note 59, at 998-1000 (criticizing the defer-
ence to plain meaning for its impact on statutory purpose). 
64. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 70, 87 (2006) (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS 1374-81 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994)
(1958)) (“[T]he words of a statue, taken in their context, serve both as guides in the attribu-
tion of general purpose and as factors limiting the particular meanings that can properly be
attributed.”).
65. BRANNON, supra note 55, at 13.  See also Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (stating courts “begin with the text” and “enforce it
according to its terms”) (quotation marks omitted); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what is says there.”).  But see BRANNON, supra note 55, at 43 (“If a
court believes that the practical consequences of a particular interpretation would undermine
the purposes of the statute, the court may reject that reading even if it is the one that seems
most consistent with the statutory text.”).  This concern may arise when courts try to avoid
“absurd and unjust result[s].”  See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429
(1998) (holding the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional because its enforcement would
lead to an “absurd and unjust result”) (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S.
564, 574 (1982) (quotation marks omitted).  This idea, also known as the “absurdity doc-
trine,” has lost relevance over time.  John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 2387, 2389-90 (2003).
66. See generally In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining the superi-
ority of the text of a statute over legislative history because the text survived the legislative 
process); see also Manning, Without Intent, supra note 53, at 2426-27 (explaining that ad-
hering to the plain meaning of texts satisfies legislative supremacy, which allows Congress 
to choose what policies to enact by voting on the text); Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpre-
tation, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1085, 1093 (1995) (citing In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th 
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member of congress would have read it when deciding how to 
vote on its enactment.67  To resolve ambiguities when they arise, 
textualists often turn to so-called “canons of construction.”68  
Textualists typically employ “semantic” canons which place spe-
cial focus on the grammatical and linguistic characteristics of the 
statute69: 
1. “Casus Omissus: A matter not covered by a statute
should be treated as intentionally omitted.”70
2. “General/Specific Canon: Where two laws con-
flict, ‘the specific governs the general . . . .’  That is,
a ‘precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more
general remedies. . . .’”71
3. “Legislative History Canons: ‘Clear evidence of
congressional intent’ gathered from legislative his-
tory ‘may illuminate ambiguous text.’”72
4. “Plain Meaning Rule and Absurdity Doctrine:
‘Follow the plain meaning of the statutory text, ex-
cept when a textual plain meaning requires an absurd
result or suggest a scrivener’s error.’”73
While there are many other canons of construction, the hand-
ful provided above both illustrate textualism’s deference to 
Cir. 1989)) (discussing textualism as being rooted in the “constitutional allocation of pow-
ers”). 
67. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68. BRANNON, supra note 55, at 25, 34-35 n.352.
69. Cory R. Liu, Textualism and the Presumption of Reasonable Drafting, 38 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 715 (2015).  Purposivists have their own collection of canons as
well, such as the “substantive canons,” which are used more frequently by purposivists than
textualists.  Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 CHI. L. REV. 879-
80 (2017).  Substantive canons “look to the legal consequences of interpretation rather than
to” the text alone.  BRANNON, supra note 55, at 28-29 (quoting LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE
LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 65 (1993)) (quotation marks omitted).
70. BRANNON, supra note 55, at 54 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 93 (1st ed. 2012)). 
71. Id. at 55 (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 70, at 183; Nitro-Lift Techs.,
L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21 (2012); Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834
(1976)).
72. Id. at 56 (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011)) (altera-
tion adopted).  The value of legislative history in statutory interpretation is especially con-
troversial among textualists.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 70, at 376-77 (criticizing 
the reliance on legislative history in statutory interpretation).  See infra Section II.A.1 for an 
overview of the debate regarding legislative history’s interpretative value. 
73. BRANNON, supra note 55, at 57 (quoting WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 1195 (5th ed. 2014)). 
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unambiguous text and are especially relevant for interpreting Rule 
410.74  
B. The Role of Legislative History
Perhaps the greatest tension between purposivists and textu-
alists is the value given to legislative history as a tool for deter-
mining congressional intent.75  Purposivists, with a focus on the 
legislative process, are far more likely to rely on legislative his-
tory when interpreting statutes than textualists.76  Legislation, 
however, is the product of a broad endeavor, and legislative his-
tory can take many forms.77  Legislative history includes commit-
tee reports, legislators’ statements, statements by bureaucrats and 
academics, rejected proposals, and even “legislative silences.”78  
All forms of legislative history are not equally reliable measure-
ments of legislative intent.79  Recognizing this, Professors Wil-
liam Eskridge, Jr. and Phillip P. Frickey formulated a “Hierarchy 
of Legislative History Sources” which includes, from most to 
least authoritative: committee reports; sponsor statements; re-
jected proposals; floor and hearing colloquy; views of non-legis-
lator drafters; legislative inaction; and subsequent legislative his-
tory. 80   
Textualism gives very little value to almost all forms of leg-
islative history, even those viewed as “most authoritative” by pur-
posivists.81  Textualism rejects legislative history for two primary 
reasons.  First, textualists believe legislative supremacy is best 
74. See BRANNON, supra note 55, at 54-64.
75. See id. at 38.
76. Id. at 11; see also Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.
REV. 2027, 2029 (2005) (stating textualists regard “legislative history adduced as evidence 
of legislative intent . . . as illegitimate”). 
77. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626
(1990). 
78. Id.
79. Id. at 636.
80. Id. (citing Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 61, at 353).  See id. for a visual
representation. 
81. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2149 (2016) (“committee reports . . . are not the law enacted by Congress”); Weinberger v. 
Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 n.15 (1982) (“remarks of a sponsor of legislation are certainly not 
controlling in analyzing legislative history”) (citing Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 118 (1980); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 311 
(1979).  See generally BRANNON, supra note 55, at 38-41. 
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served by focusing on the statutory text.82  This importance flows 
from the text’s status as the sole result of the constitutional law-
making process.83  Second, textualists are highly skeptical of leg-
islative history’s reliability.  Justice Kennedy warned that much 
of what compromises legislative history is “steps removed from 
the full Congress.” 84  Justice Breyer, alluding to an analogy used 
by Judge Harold Leventhal, once observed that using legislative 
history is like looking over a crowded cocktail party and picking 
out your friends.85 
Differences notwithstanding, there is one form of legislative 
history which both purposivists and textualists agree is highly 
probative of congressional intent: subsequent legislative amend-
ment.86  These amendments satisfy purposivism’s deference to 
the legislative process by creating a record of “congressional de-
liberation.”87  Textualists are appeased as well because these 
amendments are the result of congress exercising its lawmaking 
power.88  When comparing the pre- and post-amendment text of 
a statute, courts act under the presumption that “Congress . . . in-
tends its amendment to have [a] real and substantial effect.”89   
C. Interpreting the Rules of Evidence
As noted, both purposivism and textualism operate under the 
theory of legislative supremacy.90  The Rules, however, were not 
entirely promulgated through the traditional legislative process.91  
Instead, the Rules include both “provisions adopted by Congress 
82. BRANNON, supra note 55, at 14.
83. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (stating 
it is not proper for courts to determine a law’s meaning based on “what the lawgiver meant, 
rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated”). 
84. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 120 (2001).
85. Justice Stephen Breyer, U.S. Association of Constitutional Law Discussion on the
Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions at American University, Washington 
College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available at  [https://perma.cc/R94Z-4JDY]). 
86. See BRANNON, supra note 55, at 41.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. Stone v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995).
90. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
91. James River Ins. Co. v. Rapid Funding, LLC, 658 F.3d 1207, 1218 (10th Cir. 2011).
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and provisions adopted by the Supreme Court under the Rules 
Enabling Act.”92  Moreover, many of the Rules are codifications 
of common law principles, and some believe they should be in-
terpreted differently (i.e., in light of these principles) as a result.93  
Both considerations perhaps support a unique construction of the 
Rules.94  However, the Supreme Court has determined the Rules 
are to be interpreted the same as any other statute passed by Con-
gress.95 
i. Rules of Evidence: Purposivism
The codification theory is partially rooted in the text of Rule 
10296—specifically, the Rule’s call for courts to “promote the de-
velopment of evidence law.”97  This theory, championed by Pro-
fessor Glen Weissenberger, views the Rules of Evidence as “a 
perpetual index code” instead of statutes.98  Per Professor Weis-
senberger, interpreting the Rules as statutes is “inappropriately 
defer[ential] to legislative supremacy. . . .”99  Under this model, 
federal courts have “dynamic authority to expand the law of evi-
dence consistent with the values” of administrative fairness and 
efficiency pursuant to Rule 102.100   
92. Id.
93. Glen Weissenberger, The Proper Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Insights From Article VI, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1615, 1619-20 (2009) [hereinafter Weissen-
berger, Proper Interpretation] (“[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence represent a codification of 
the pre-existing common law . . . which informs their interpretation.”). 
94. See Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Pro-
cedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson In Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 32 
(2008) (“[T]he Rules Enabling Act serves as a quintessential illustration of a statute whose 
ambiguous text must be interpreted in light of objectively determined background purposes, 
rather than via a narrow focus on either the literal meaning of the text or the specifics of 
legislative history.”); Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia, supra note 12, at 1566 (stating Rule 
of Evidence 102 “expressly invites, if not commands,” an activist interpretation of the Rules). 
95. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
96. Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia, supra note 12, at 1552.
97. FED. R. EVID. 102.  See also Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia, supra note 12, at
1580.  It should be noted that when crafting the codification theory, Professor Weissenberger 
relied on a version of Rule 102 which contained the phrase “promotion of the growth and 
development of the law of evidence.”  Id. at 1551.  The fact that the rule in its current state 
no longer contains the “promotion of growth” language is important as it is no longer as fair 
to infer legislative permission to  expand beyond the Rules’ text. 
98. Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia, supra note 12, at 1580.
99. Id. at 1587.
100. Glen Weissenberger, The Elusive Identity of The Federal Rules of Evidence, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1614 (1999) [hereinafter Weissenberger, Elusive Identity]. 
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Courts have not gone so far as to expressly accept the invi-
tation to disregard legislative supremacy.101  However, many have 
looked past unambiguous text and made decisions based on the 
purpose, or “spirit,” of the Rules in light of efficient administra-
tion and common law values.102  These broader interpretations are 
especially notable in cases where courts review “specialized rel-
evance rules.”103 
ii. Rules of Evidence: Textualism
While some advocate for the broader purposivist interpreta-
tion of the Rules, the United States Supreme Court has largely 
turned to textualism.104  Moreover, the Court has rejected the no-
tion that the text of a congressionally promulgated rule can be 
overpowered by common law values.105  At most, the common 
law can “serve as an aid to [the Rules’] application.”106 
By interpreting the Rules textually, the Court “rejected the 
traditional, legal process approach” which “viewed each piece of 
101. At the time of this writing, the author found no caselaw adopting or discussing
the Rules as a “perpetual index code.” 
102. See Ronda-Perez v. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentina-Puerto Rico, 404 F.3d 42,
47 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding exclusion of a rejected offer when that evidence fit “within the 
spirit[,] if not the letter” of Rule 408); United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 
1976) (imputing “the rationale of” Rule 408 to Rule 410); Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. 
v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d 907, 918 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding trial court properly
admitted evidence because exclusion would “strain the spirit of” Rule 407); see also FISHER,
supra note 7, at 143.
103. Federal Rules of Evidence 407-11 are sometimes characterized as “specialized
relevance rules.”  Lauren Tallent, Through the Lens of Federal Evidence Rule 403: An Ex-
amination of Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony Admissibility in the Federal Circuit 
Courts, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 765, 782 n.104 (2011). 
104. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond “Top Down” Grand Theories of Statu-
tory Construction: A “Bottom Up” Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
75 OR. L. REV. 389, 390 (1996) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond] (“Until recently, 
Supreme Court Justices largely adopted a ‘textualist’ approach to the construction of the 
rules.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court’s Approach to the 
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV. 267, 267 (1993) [hereinafter 
Imwinkelried, Brief Defense] (stating the Supreme Court “has adopted a moderate textualist 
approach to the construction of the Rules”). 
105. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (“the Rules oc-
cupy the field”); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984) (“In the case of [the] Rules, 
too, it must be remembered that Congress extensively reviewed our submission, and consid-
erably revised it.”); see also Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of 
Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 915 (1978) (“In principle, under the Federal Rules no com-
mon law of evidence remains.”). 
106. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
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legislation as purposeful and rational.”107  Rather, the Court has 
interpreted the Rules under a “moderate textualist approach.”108  
This moderate textualism “recognize[s] a strong, albeit rebutta-
ble, presumption” that a Rule’s text “prevails over any contrary 
meaning suggested by” legislative history.109  Even under moder-
ate textualism, a Rule’s plain meaning will take priority so long 
as it would not lead to an absurd result.110   
The textual approach is further bolstered by reading Rule 
402.111  A textual reading leads to the conclusion that Rule 402 
expressly governs whether “courts retain the power to enforce 
[common law] exclusionary rules to block the admission of rele-
vant evidence.”112  By 402’s language, if the question of admissi-
bility can be answered by the United States Constitution, a federal 
statue, the Rules, or other rules prescribed by the United States 
Supreme Court, then common law considerations carry little to no 
weight.113   
III. DEFENDANT-OFFERED EVIDENCE IS NOT
PER SE INADMISSABLE 
Rule 410 is undoubtedly a statute.  Courts tasked with inter-
preting Rule 410 must strive to achieve the legislature’s intent just 
as they would with any other statute.114  As noted, the two primary 
approaches courts use to ascertain Congress’s intent are textual-
ism and purposivism.115  To comport with the notion of legislative 
107. Imwinkelried, Brief Defense, supra note 104, at 268.
108. Id. at 267.
109. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Whether The Federal Rules of Evidence Should Be Con-
ceived as a Perpetual Index Code: Blindness is Worse Than Myopia, 40 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1595, 1596 (1999) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Blindness is Worse].  This legislative 
history includes materials such as Advisory Committee Notes and congressional committee 
rules.  Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond, supra note 104, at 391. 
110. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 566 (1989); Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 
760-62 (1990) (discussing Zolin, 491 U.S. 554); see also Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond,
supra note 104, at 391.
111. See Imwinkelried, Blindness is Worse, supra note 109, at 1608-09.
112. Id. at 1608.
113. See id.
114. See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
115. BRANNON, supra note 55, at 10.
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supremacy, courts must read specialized relevance rules, such as 
Rule 410, textually.   
A. Rule 410 Must Be Interpreted as a Statute
As noted, there is much debate as to whether the Rules 
should be interpreted as statutes or merely as codifications of the 
common law.116  There should be no such debate about Rule 410.  
Rule 410 is not one of the many Rules adopted by the Supreme 
Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.117  Instead, it was leg-
islatively promulgated after much consideration and debate.118  
Rule 410 also cannot be seen as a simple codification of common 
law principles.  Plea bargaining is a relatively new component of 
the American justice system, and jurisprudence concerning the 
admissibility of plea-related evidence only goes back to the early 
twentieth century.119  Thus, neither factor in support of a non-stat-
utory reading of the Rules is present with Rule 410.120  The criti-
cal inquiry, then, is not whether Rule 410 is a statute, but how 
courts should interpret and apply Rule 410.   
B. Rule 410 Must Be Interpreted Under Textualism
Textualism provides the proper interpretation of Rule 410
because a textual reading best comports with the notion of legis-
lative supremacy.121  Under the guise of the Rules, Congress has 
instructed the judiciary to only admit evidence if a judge finds it 
116. See supra Part II.B.
117. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:64.
118. Id. (Rule 410 was originally enacted by Congress in 1975); Miller, supra note 11,
at 412 (Rule 410 was legislatively amended in 1979). 
119. Alschuler, supra note 23, at 10, 33; see Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,
225 (1927) (prohibiting evidence of a withdrawn guilty plea). 
120. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 94, at 32 (stating rules promulgated under
the Rules Enabling Act “must be interpreted in light of objectively determined background 
purposes, rather than via a narrow focus on either the literal meaning of the text or the spe-
cifics of legislative history.”); Weissenberger, Proper Interpretation, supra note 93, at 1619-
20 (claiming that pre-existing common law must influence judicial interpretations of the 
Rules ). 
121. See Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must
presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there.”); see also In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1341-42 (7th Cir. 1989); Manning, Without Intent, 
supra note 53, at 2426-27; Frickey, supra note 66, at 1093. 
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relevant to the case.122  Determining relevance under Rule 401 is 
a fact-intensive inquiry which Congress has largely left to the 
courts.123  Yet with specialized relevance rules, such as Rule 410, 
Congress takes decision-making authority away from trial judges 
and deems certain pieces of evidence inadmissible no matter how 
relevant they may be to a particular case.  These specialized rele-
vance rules only apply to very specific forms of evidence and in 
narrow circumstances.124  If the offered evidence fits within the 
scope of the Rule’s text, then legislative supremacy demands that 
courts deem the evidence inadmissible without further considera-
tion.  If it does not, Congress has clearly intended for trial judges 
to determine admissibility by balancing the evidence’s relevance 
and probative value against its unfair prejudice.125  Thus, trial 
judges must read these Rules closely to determine where Con-
gress has allocated decision-making power. 
i. Rule 410’s Plain Language Is Unambiguous
Simply reading the Rule’s text makes clear that Rule 410 is 
inapplicable when the defendant is the party offering the plea-re-
lated evidence.  As noted, specialized relevance rules such as Rule 
410 apply only to particular forms of evidence under narrow cir-
cumstances.126  Rule 410 governs a rather wide array of evi-
dence—essentially anything related to the plea-bargaining pro-
cess.127  However, this seemingly broad jurisdiction is 
significantly narrowed by the fact that Rule 410 is only triggered 
when that evidence is being offered against the defendant who 
122. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
123. See FED. R. EVID. 401; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:3 (“deci-
sions on relevancy are made on a case-by-case basis, and each is dependent on surrounding 
facts, circumstances, and issues”). 
124. See FED R. EVID. 407 (only barring evidence of subsequent remedial measures
when used to establish negligence or culpability); FED. R. EVID. 408 (only barring evidence 
from civil settlement negotiations when used to establish liability); FED R. EVID. 409 (only 
barring offers to pay medical or similar expenses when used to establish liability); FED R. 
EVID. 410 (only barring evidence from criminal plea negotiations when used against the 
same defendant who was part of the plea negotiations); FED R. EVID. 411 (only barring evi-
dence of insurance coverage when used to establish negligence or culpability).  
125. See FED R. EVID. 401-03.
126. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
127. See FED R. EVID. 410.
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was a party to the plea-bargaining discussions.128  Since these pa-
rameters are clearly dictated within the Rule’s text, Rule 410 is 
unambiguous.129   
Because Rule 410’s text is clear, there is no reason for courts 
to turn to purposivism or textualism.130  Applied as written, Rule 
410 requires trial judges to ask, as a threshold question, whether 
the evidence is being admitted “against the defendant who made 
the plea or participated in the plea discussions.”131  When the an-
swer to this question is no, courts must turn to the traditional evi-
dentiary analysis provided in Rules 401-03.  
ii. Rule 410 Under the Canons of Construction
Despite this simplicity, courts use Rule 410 to exclude evi-
dence offered by the defendant.132  As a result, Rule 410’s silence 
on defendant-offered evidence is treated as an ambiguity, opening 
the door to contrary interpretations.133  Additionally, some have 
observed that Rule 410’s failure to address defendant-offered ev-
idence is “hard to understand.”134  Because of this lapse, it is ar-
gued courts should look “to the policies underlying Rule 410” and 
take “resort” in Rule 408.135  The aforementioned canons of 
128. See id.
129. Id.  See also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:64 (acknowledging
that Rule 410’s plain language clearly does not govern admissibility of evidence offered by 
the defendant). 
130. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)
(“When the statutory ‘language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’”) (ci-
tation omitted). 
131. FED R. EVID 410.
132. See FISHER, supra note 7, at 143 (explaining that courts have generally held de-
fendant-offered evidence inadmissible because it contradicts the “purpose” behind Rule 
410). 
133. The majority of courts have chosen to conduct a purposivist analysis and hold
defendant-offered evidence inadmissible because of Rule 410’s goal to foster plea negotia-
tions.  See id. (stating that “courts generally have ignored the strict language”).  But see 
United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 205 (1995) (acknowledging that Rule 410 
“leave[s] open the possibility that a defendant may offer [plea-related] statements . . . for his 
own tactical advantage”); United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 690 (2d Cir. 1990) (ac-
knowledging Rule 410’s plain language does not prohibit defendant-offered evidence). 
134. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:64.
135. Id.  This is precisely what the Eighth Circuit did in United States v. Verdoorn.
See supra Part I.B.1. 
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construction establishes that these methods are inconsistent with 
the fundamental notion of legislative supremacy.   
First, the “plain meaning rule and absurdity doctrine” canon 
of construction states that a statute’s unambiguous language 
should always govern unless enforcement would lead to an “ab-
surd result.”136  Applying Rule 410 as written does not lead to an 
absurd result.  Rather, it gives criminal defendants the opportunity 
to argue their innocence by presenting evidence of an innocent 
state of mind or the prosecutor’s doubt in their guilt.137  Some 
observers characterize this as an absurd result because allowing 
the defendant to present statements from plea negotiations “would 
be confusing to juries and likely misleading.”138  However, Con-
gress has already addressed these concerns with Rule 403.139   
Second, a statute’s silence does not empower courts to fill in 
the blanks.  The “casus omissus” cannon provides that when a 
statute is silent on a matter, courts should treat it as a purposeful 
omission by Congress.140  Thus, blatantly ignoring the omission 
would contradict the foundational notion of legislative suprem-
acy.141 
Third, taking “resort”142 in Rule 408 is contrary to the “gen-
eral/specific” cannon of construction.143  When two statutes con-
flict, courts should defer to the one that is more narrowly tailored 
to the situation.144  Rules 408 and 410 clearly conflict, as 408 pro-
hibits evidence of negotiations regardless of which party offers 
the evidence while 410 is only triggered when the evidence is of-
fered against the defendant.145  Thus, Rule 408 should have no 
bearing because Rule 410 is precisely drawn for the express 
136. BRANNON, supra note 55, at 57 (quoting ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., supra note 73, at
1195). 
137. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:71.
138. Id. § 4:64.
139. See infra Part IV.B.
140. BRANNON, supra note 55, at 54 (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 70, at
93). 
141. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (stating courts
must “give effect to the intent of Congress”). 
142. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:64.
143. BRANNON, supra note 55, at 55 (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 70, at
183). 
144. Id.
145. Compare FED. R. EVID. 408, with FED. R. EVID. 410.
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purpose of governing admissibility of plea-related evidence in 
criminal prosecutions.146 
Finally, Rule 410’s legislative history supports the claim that 
a prohibition on defendant-offered evidence was purposely omit-
ted.  Under the “legislative history” canon, looking to a statute’s 
legislative history is permissible to “illuminate ambiguous 
text.”147  The most authoritative form of legislative history is sub-
sequent legislative amendment.148  The original version of Rule 
410 deemed plea-related evidence inadmissible when offered 
against “the person who made the plea or offer.”149  This language 
was ambiguous as to whether the rule excluded evidence offered 
against the prosecution.  In a situation where the prosecutor initi-
ates plea negotiations, the government may be viewed as extend-
ing an offer through the prosecutor as its agent, and therefore 
could be covered by the rule.150 
Due to such ambiguities, and a desire to narrow the exclu-
sionary window, Congress amended Rule 410.151  As a result, the 
rule only forbids plea-related evidence when it is offered “against 
the defendant who made the plea or participated in the plea dis-
cussions.”152  Because Congress intends for such amendments to 
have a “real and substantial effect,” courts using Rule 410 to ex-
clude evidence offered by the defendant are not showing appro-
priate deference to legislative supremacy.153 
146. Even advocates for taking “resort” in Rule 408 acknowledge doing so is “at best
awkward.”  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:71. 
147. BRANNON, supra note 55, at 56 (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S.
562, 572 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148. See id. at 41.
149. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (providing Rule 410’s
original language). 
150. Scott D. Hammond, The U.S. Model of Negotiated Plea Agreements: A Good
Deal With Benefits for All, U.S. DEP’T. JUST. (Oct. 17, 2006), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/atr/speech/us-model-negotiated-plea-agreements-good-deal-benefits-all (“Either 
the government or the defendant can initiate plea negotiations . . . .”); see also Cynthia 
Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV. 
L.J. 401, 407 (2017) (explaining that prosecutors often employ “take-it-or-leave-it” offers in
plea negotiations”).
151. See Miller, supra note 11, at 412-13.
152. FED. R. EVID. 410 (emphasis added).
153. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995).
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IV. THE CURRENT EVIDENTIARY SCHEME IS
COMPETENT TO HANDLE DEFENDANT-OFFERED 
EVIDENCE 
The foregoing analysis is not meant to proclaim that state-
ments from plea negotiations are always admissible when offered 
by the defendant.  Rather, it establishes that Congress has allo-
cated the decision-making authority to trial judges.  In doing so, 
Congress commands trial judges to determine whether the de-
fendant-offered evidence is relevant and weigh its probative value 
against the unfair prejudice, if any.154   
A. Relevance and Probative Value
Relevance is a notoriously low barrier to overcome.155  De-
termining whether a piece of evidence is relevant requires the trial 
judge to assess “materiality” and “probative value.”156  Evidence 
is material if it “is of consequence in determining the action.”157  
Probative value is measured by the evidence’s “tendency to make 
a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evi-
dence.”158   
Defendants offering evidence from plea negotiations are 
likely trying to prove an innocent conscience or the prosecutor’s 
lack of confidence in the defendant’s guilt.159  Both purposes eas-
ily surpass the low threshold of relevance.  As to materiality, “ev-
idence of a defendant’s innocent state of mind” has been 
154. See FED. R. EVID. 401-03.  Rule 401 defines relevant evidence.  FED. R. EVID.
401. Rule 402 creates a presumption of admissibility for relevant evidence.  FED. R. EVID.
402. Rule 403 allows for the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence if there is a risk of
unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs the evidence’s probative value.  FED. R. EVID.
403.
155. E.g., Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 114 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he bar for what con-
stitutes relevant evidence is low.”). 
156. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 395 (7th ed. 2014).
157. FED R. EVID 401(b).
158. FED R. EVID. 401(a).
159. State v. Woodsum, 624 A.2d 1342, 1344 (N.H. 1993) (stating that “[m]any infer-
ences follow from a defendant’s decision to exercise his or her right to a jury trial,” including 
“that a defendant [truly] believes he or she did not commit the crime [charged]”); Miller, 
supra note 11, at 408 (discussing Woodsum); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 
4:71 (suggesting a prosecutor may offer a plea deal because “a jury may doubt parts of her 
case”). 
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described as “critical to a fair adjudication of criminal 
charges.”160  Evidence of a prosecutor’s lack of confidence in 
their own case has also been deemed admissible.  In State v. 
Black, a trial court allowed the defendants to present “the delay 
in the commencement of the prosecution against them as an im-
plied admission” as evidence that the prosecution was “conscious 
of the weakness of the State’s case against the defendants.”161 
Turning to probative value, a defendant’s rejection of a plea 
offer is probative of “an innocent state of mind.”162  A favorable 
plea offer can be a persuasive sign of innocence, as “innocent de-
fendants typically receive especially attractive plea offers.”163  
Therefore, courts should view a defendant’s rejection of such an 
offer as “some evidence of an innocent state of mind.”164  Evi-
dence of a plea offer is likewise probative of a prosecutor’s doubt 
as to the defendant’s guilt because these doubts are among the 
most prominent reasons prosecutors offer plea bargains.165  How-
ever, “relevance alone does not [guarantee] . . . admissibility.”166 
B. Unfair Prejudice
While there is a presumption of admissibility for relevant ev-
idence,167 courts may nonetheless exclude it “if its probative value 
160. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 692 (2d Cir. 1990).
161. State v. Black, 53 S.E.2d 443, 445 (N.C. 1949); see also Miller, supra note 11, at
442 (discussing Black). 
162. Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 691 (stating that rejection of a favorable plea offer “could . . .
evidence” an innocent mind); see also note 49 and accompanying text. 
163. Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of
International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2002). 
164. Miller, supra note 11, at 449.  But see Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1943 (1992) (characterizing guilty defendants 
as “unusually prone to risk taking” and therefore more likely to reject a favorable plea offer 
and gamble on the outcome of a trial).  
165. See generally Miller, supra note 11, at 446; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 58 (1968) (“[S]trength or 
weakness of the state’s case [is viewed] as the most important factor in the task of bargain-
ing.”); John Gleeson, The Sentencing Commission and Prosecutorial Discretion: The Role 
of the Courts in Policing Sentence Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639, 642 n.10 (2008) 
(providing a 1964 study which found that 85% of prosecutors “were influenced by weak-
nesses in the government’s case”).  
166. GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, Inc., 930 F.3d 76, 85 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 133, 1343 (3d Cir. 2002). 
167. FED. R. EVID. 402 (relevant evidence is generally admissible unless the Constitu-
tion, a federal statute, other rules of evidence, or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court 
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is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair preju-
dice.”168  Observers have largely noted two sources of unfair prej-
udice when defendants offer evidence of statements made during 
plea negotiations.  First, such evidence may be “confusing to ju-
ries and likely misleading.”169  Second, and much more promi-
nent, is the fear that “admitting such statements would discourage 
plea bargaining.”170  Neither concern justifies a blanket prohibi-
tion on defendants’ ability to admit statements made during plea 
negotiations. 
Rule 403 expressly provides that evidence, while relevant, 
may be excluded if it presents a danger of “misleading the 
jury.”171  However, it is only proper to exclude the evidence if the 
likelihood of juror confusion “substantially outweigh[s]” the evi-
dence’s probative value.172  Thus, Rule 403 requires trial judges 
to undertake a factually-intensive inquiry before deciding 
whether relevant evidence—such as a rejected plea offer or a 
prosecutor’s statements—may be excluded for fear of juror con-
fusion. 
The judiciary’s desire to protect and encourage plea bargain-
ing is similarly unsupportive of a blanket prohibition.  It is true 
that conservation of judicial resources is a key concern underlying 
Rule 403 and that plea bargaining is an “essential component” of 
the efficient administration of justice.173  Still, Rule 403 is con-
cerned with efficiency within a particular proceeding, not within 
the judicial system as a whole.  Such an overarching concern is 
best left to Congress.174  If the legislature finds that the judicial 
demand otherwise).  See also Coleman, 306 F.3d at 1343 (“[T]here is a strong presumption 
that relevant evidence should be admitted . . . .”).  
168. FED. R. EVID. 403.
169. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 11, § 4:64.
170. Id.  Courts using Rule 410 to impose a blanket prohibition have largely done so
out of a desire to protect and encourage plea bargaining.  See e.g., United States v. Verdoorn, 
528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1976); see also FISHER, supra note 7, at 143.  
171. FED. R. EVID. 403.
172. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
173. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).  See also FED. R. EVID. 403
(allowing relevant evidence to be excluded if it presents a danger of “undue delay, wasting 
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 
(2012) (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1912) (“[Plea bargaining] is not some 
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”).  
174. This is evidenced by Congress’s promulgation of the “specialized relevance
rules.”  See supra Part III. 
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branch cannot properly function while also allowing defendants 
to present evidence of rejected plea offers and prosecutors’ state-
ments, Congress should amend Rule 410 to exclude such evi-
dence.   
CONCLUSION 
This Comment does not claim that evidence of statements 
from plea negotiations is admissible anytime it is offered by the 
defendant.  But it does criticize the majority of courts for their 
improper interpretation and application of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 410.  Rule 410 is a congressionally promulgated statute.  
When courts are tasked with interpreting statutes, they must strive 
“to give effect to the intent of Congress.”175  The proper way to 
achieve this goal is to enforce statutes according to their plain lan-
guage.176  Rule 410 clearly does not prohibit defendants from pre-
senting evidence of a rejected plea offer or statements made dur-
ing plea negotiations.  Yet, courts routinely prevent defendants 
from doing so because of a desire to promote and encourage plea 
bargaining.177  Instead, courts should be analyzing the probative 
value and unfair prejudice of the defendant-offered evidence on a 
case-by-case basis—as Congress has commanded them to do.178 
175. United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
176. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must pre-
sume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there.”). 
177. See FISHER, supra note 7, at 143.
178. See supra Part III.B.1.
